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There are two highly inportant problems m our constitu-
tional system to which we have given no proper solution. These
two problems are the relation of the Executive to Congress and
of the States to the Federal Government. These two questions
have plagued us through every stage of our national develop-
ment, at certain times more acutely than at others, but at no
time have we really been free from these two leading questions.
This is especially tr~e of the question of the relation of the
States to the National Government. Almost every great crisis
in our national politics has turned on this question. It lay at
the heart of the bitter controversy over nullification, it was at
the center of the disastrous controversy over the extension of
slavery, and today several important issues, chief among them
prohibition and public utility regulation, have brought public
discussion to focus around this fundamental theme. There is
every indication that this question is going to be a cardinal ques-
tion of public discussion in the period immediately ahead of us.
Since our present federal system, with the states as the com-
ponent units, has crystallized into patriotic dogma, any frontal
attack upon it is sure to arouse intense resistance. Practical
politics, therefore, bids us shy clear of any proposed solution
which involves a modification of our present system. However,
if it embodies glaring defects, such that we cannot hope to thrive
so long as we retain it unmodified, an early and fearless criticism
of it, in order that we may remedy its defects, remains the only
enlightened policy to pursue.
As a typically orthodox statement of the principle govern-
mg the division of powers we may take the statement of James
Wilson in an address to the Convention of Pennsylvama:
"Whatever object of government is confined in its operation and
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effect within the bounds of a particular state, should be con-
sidered as belonging to the government of that state, whatever
object of government extends its operation or effects beyond the
bounds of a particular state, should be considered as belonging
to the government of the United States."1 "In short", says a
leading modern scholar, "there should be one government for
national affairs and a number of local governments for local
affairs."12 Tins formula, so unquestionably accepted, sounds
simple enough, but it would be a rare gemus indeed, who could
divide the functions of government on this principle between
the national government and states varying in size as do the
forty-eight states. The area of Rhode Island is 1,067 square
miles, an area less than that of most counties in western states,
while Texas covers an area of 262,398 square miles, or an area
equal to the combined areas of Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Aus-
tria and Germany A problem quickly spills over state bound-
ary lines in Rhode Island, whereas problems of vast magnitude
remain local problems as far as Texas is concerned. What may
be a county affair in the West becomes an inter-state affair in
New England, while Texas can successfully regulate a problem
winch in Europe would require international action.
There has arisen on all sides a great concern over the de-
cline of the states, and that from unexpected quarters. The
best state's rights speeches of the last decade have come not
from unreconstructed southern Democrats, but from Republicans
in high places. President Coolidge warned against the danger
to the states from federal encroachments and pleaded for the
necessity of maintaining the vigor of state governments, and
President Hoover has expressed himself in the same vein.3 This
concern for the future of the states is not unwarranted. "The
truth is," as Professor Merriam puts it, "that the state is stand-
ing upon slippery ground as a political unit. '4  This need sur-
prise no one, in fact the surprise is that they continue to reflect
as much vitality as they do. Only thirteen of our states have an
independent historic background, and that historic background
RlZliot's Debates, II, 424.
2 Garner, Introduction to Political Scemce, pp. 193-4.
SLincoln Day Speech. Text in New York Times, February 13,
1931.
4 In an article on "Metropolitan Regions," The University of Chi-
cago Magazine, May, 1928.
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has been pretty well obliterated, due to population movements
and new social and economic integrations. Most of the other
states are creatures of the surveyor's chain, their boundaries are
lines drawn in the sand. Few of our states are economic and
social units and their validity as units of organization and
representation is subject to serious challenge. Through an in-
evitable process the states have lost power and prestige to both
city and the nation, both of which are vigorous, orgamc units.
All this anxiety over the declining vitality of the states is
misplaced concern. The dangers- of overcentralization in the
federal government are real, but the problem is in no way met
by trying to keep alive decaying, artificial political units by
frantically applying the pulmotor. Those who look for a coun-
ter weight to the increasing power of the national government
must look elsewhere. Professor Merriam tersely suggests that
"those interested in preserving the balance of powers between
the national and local governments, might find the urban com-
munity a more effective counter-weight to the centralizing tend-
encies of the Federal Government than the feebly struggling
states which now make such ineffectual resistance to the continu-
ous pressure of national consolidation. A city would
not be obliged to climb far to go beyond a state. Already there
are seventeen cities of a population of over 500,000, nine states
with less population than that. And if economic resources and
cultural prestige are added to numbers, the contrast is far more
striking." However, the best solution to the problem of finding
both a counter-weight to federal centralization and a more effec-
tive governmental unit than the State is to be found in the
region.
The problem will be simplified by laying down certain
fundamental principles which ought to be observed in the erec-
tion of any administrative and political units.5 First, in the
interest of economy of admimstration and the avoidance of un-
necessary conflict of jurisdiction there should be a nnnnnum of
overlapping jurisdictions and no twilight zone in which no
authority is competent to act. Until the Eighteenth Amend-
ment there was no very serious problem of overlapping jursdic-
r See Lindsay, "Social Aspects of Federal and State Control," The
Annals of the American Academy of PoZitical and Social Science, Vol.
CXXIX, 88 ff.
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tion, but the concurrent duty, if such it be, imposed by the
Eighteenth Amendment represents a departure which will make
confusion worse confounded. Even more alarming is the exten-.
mon-of the area of the twilight zone which lies between state and
federal functions, by the action of the Supreme Court m vetoing
state laws under the equal-rights and due-process clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Nothing more calculated to under-
mine the vitality of state government could be conceived than
this judicial vetoing of state action in "matters confessedly of
local concern, dealing solely with local situations, and expressing
remedies derived from local experiences." The Court seems at
present bent on destroying the vitality of the states by so limit-
ing their powers as to render them impotent in coping with local
social-economic problems. The Supreme Court has invalidated
more state legislation in the last ten years than in the fifty years
preceding. The mortality rate of such laws coming before the
Court during the last decade has run between thirty and thirty-
five per cent. Felix Frankfurter brands this judicial veto over
state social-economic legislation as "the most vulnerable aspect
of undue centralization" and as at once the most destructive and
the least responsible.6
A second guiding principle in determining governmental
units is that the jurisdiction of the controlling authority on the
one hand should be as extensive as the problem or lifstitution to
be regulated, while on the other hand the unit should be kept as
small as possible in order that the control may be vested as
near as possible to the people directly affected in the exercise
of that control. It is a commonplace that our social and econo-
mic environment and the technique of social cooperation have
thrust themselves upward and outward, causing small units to
become obsolete and decay, making possible the transference of
functions from the smaller to the larger area of administration,
and ever making larger units necessary Failure to move func-
tions up to larger governmental areas or creating new ones is the
cause of serious mal-adjustment, which we have been slow in
correcting. This is especially true of our local units. A reduc-
tion in the number of the counties in Kentucky from 120 to
something like 30 would greatly improve the efficiency of admin-
8 The Public and Its Government, 1930, p. 50.
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istration, and yield an annual saving to the people of the state
of a sum variously estimated at between 3 to 8 million dollars.
That our changing social environment is creating a constantly
increasing number of regional problems-problems too large for
the state and too small for national jurisdiction, is indicated by
the increasing number of inter-state suits and inter-state com-
pacts. Prior to 1880 there were eleven inter-state suits and eight
inter-state compacts, during the following 43 years there were
28 suits and 24 compacts. The compact clause has been resorted
to to solve legislative difficulties in such widely varying and im-
portant fields as the control and improvement of navigation,
penal jurisdiction, uniformity of legislation, conservation of
natural resources, utility regulation and taxation.
This problem of jurisdictional areas has become acute with
respect to public utilities which operate on a regional basis. This
is well illustrated by the East Olho Company case before the
United States Supreme Court in 1930. This company, which
distributes natural gas from West Virgima to about fifty Ohio
cities, sought an injunction against Ohio to restrain it from
collecting an excise tax on its business on the grounds that the tax
violates the interstate commerce clause. Mr. Gilbert Bettman,
Attorney General of Ohio, succinctly summarized the significance
of the case and some of the problems involved. "If the Supreme
Court of the United States should adopt the East Ohio conten-
tion and should tie together the engineering and financial
developments of modern America so that the business of these
great underlying commodities of power, oil and gas remained
inter-state commerce from point of origin to point of final con-
sumption, then the original gift, so grudgingly bestowed by the
States on the National government, of the power to regulate
inter-state commerce would indeed be a quit claim deed to half
the sovereignty of the individual States this will dis-
crumnate against the gas-producing industry and the digging
of gas wells in Ohio. The only alternative would be to
permit all business of local gas distribution to escape the burden
of taxation, thus freeing a vast and profitable enterprise whose
properties and activities are protected locally and whose earning
power is substantially guaranteed by State regulation, from
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bearing its legitimate part of governmental expense.' '7 The
Supreme Court fortunately rendered a decision upholding the
Ohio tax.8 However, this decision by no means solves all ques.
tions involved in the general problem. A regional problem such
as this requires regional solution.
It is generally asserted that the governmental unit should
be kept as small as possible in order that the government may be
kept near the people, for centralization of power in distant cen-
ters supposedly leads to tyranny, corruption and social paralysis.
In the light of conditions generally prevailing in our counties,
some so small that one cannot convemently turn around in them
in a Ford, the virtue of small political units may have been over-
rated. It is not proved that small governmental units are the
most vital, nor the best and most cheaply governed, nor the ones
in which the voters take the greatest interest.
The third and most important guiding principle with
respect to administrative and political units is that the area
should as nearly as possible represent social and economic unities.
Our state lines for the most part have been drawn in utter
defiance of social and econonc facts. As just two glaring
examples of this we may point to the metropolitan areas of
Chicago and New York, each of which includes territory of
three states. More important for our immediate discussion is
the fact that by reason of its vast size the United States socially
and economically is divided into regions rather than into states.
Differences of climate, geography, economic specialization and
social habits have united regional groups of states in interest and
character. "The New England states," wrote Woodrow Wilson,
"have always been in most respects of a piece, the Southern
States had always more interests in common than points of con-
trast, and the Mliddle States were so similarly compounded even
in the day of the erection of the government that they might
without material inconvenience have been treated as a single
economic and political unit.'' 9 Sectionalism, while largely
ignored by the government and political scientists, is constantly
utilized by politicians. Our foremost interpreter of the signifi-
'Vew York Times, April 24, 1931.
ORast Ohio Gas Company v. Taz Commsston of Ohio, 283 United
States Reports 465.
'North Ainerean Rewew, CLXXXVII, 684 ff.
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cance of the frontier, F J. Turner, points out that "again and
again throughout our political history there has been a break-
down of party voting and alliances between regional groups
regardless of party affiliations. Calhoun's whole political career
shows a desire to use a sectional balance of power and to combine
the West with the South. Van Buren would have an entente
cordiale between the plain Republicans of the middle region and
the planters of the South led by Virginia. Henry Clay and
John Adams would join the northern zone of the Ohio valley
and the North Atlantic. Benton wished to hold the West to a
position where, as its political power increased with the admis-
sion of new states and with the growth of population, it should
be 'bid for', as he said by other sections." The difficulties which
this sectionalism is now causing our major parties, is too painful
for extended discussion.
This sectionalism causes great political difficulties. Presi-
dential elections are won by a combination of sections, but it is
very difficult to hold the sections in line in Congress between
elections. Since the majority of voters live in the industrial
North East, roughly, in the region north of the Ohio and east of
the Mississippi, that region almost invariably controls the presi-
dent as well as the majority of the House of Representatives, but
the rural South and West control the Senate. No matter which
party or combination is used to win the presidential election,
close cooperation between the executive and both branches of
Congress must always be more of a miracle than a normal expec-
tation. If some of these issues which cause bitter sectional align-
ments in Congress could be devolved upon homogeneous regions
there would be a vast gain all around.
These regions are in the largest sense of the term, metropoli-
tan areas. They are characterized by the financial and industrial
dominance of some large city People within a considerable
radius of this metropolis are under its economic and social sway
Bound together by the facts of nature rather than by political
expediency, these metropolitan regions are sure of a lasting
vitality, and their people will be drawn together to press the
conservation and promotion of regional interests. Examples of
this are not lacking. An outstanding example of this is the
New England Council created in 1925 to devise means of
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overcoming the economic depression in that section m those
years. As a result of the work of this Council, composed of
representatives of six states, in stock-taking, self-analysis, and
planning for the future, a new hopeful regional philosophy has
been engendered, and through a regional mercantilism readjust-
ment has been substituted for what seemed like a permanent
decline.
The government'has on a few occasions been led to the recog-
nition of regions. Under the Federal Reserve Banking Act the
country was divided into twelve regions. The Department of
Commerce has undertaken a survey of our national resources as
an aid to their exploitation, and for the purposes of this sufivey
the country has been divided into nine regions. In its first
report, the Commercial Survey of the Southeast, which appeared
in 1927, this large section of the country is described as a definite
economic province, possessing "homogeneity in fundamental
economic factors." Now one may be sure that a definite econo-
mic province inevitably develops a cultural unity and a common
political outlook.
Now what constitutional devices are there which may be
utilized for the settlement of regional problems and for setting
up regional jurisdictions. Frankfurter mentions about ten
devices for settling problems transcending state lines but not of
a nature for Congress to handle. Mlost of them are of limited
potentiality, especially for developing regional governments and
are therefore only mentioned. They include conferences on
uniform state legislation, reciprocal legislation, conferences of
governors and other state officials for the purpose of stimulating
common state action, auxiliary federal legislation, grants-rn-aid,
the achievement of a practical fusion of control by means of joint
sessions and joint action of legally distinct administrative
agencies; the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over controvers-
ies between states, and finally the compact clause.
Of these devices the compact clause holds the greatest
promise for establishing anything like regional political and
administrative units, though that promise is still clothed in un-
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certainty and is at best probably none too good. 10 The Port of
New York Board may be cited as an instance of the very suc-
cessful application of the compact clause for the purpose of
regulating and developing an interest common to two states, an
interest which neither acting singly could adequately control
or develop. Under this compact a new administrative district is
set up, with comnissioners, chosen by each state, to act as the
governing body A great advantage of the interstate compact
is the suppleness in dealing with interstate but non-regional
problems. To put it differently, the compact may be used caus
ally, and not merely spatially As an example of this I may cite
the recent suggestion of Secretary Wilbur in a letter1 ' to the
Governors of Texas, California, Oklahoma, Ohio, Kansas, Loun-
smana, Arkansas, Wyoming, Colorado and New Mexico, in which
he recommends that these states, so widely separated geographic-
ally, but all confronted by a common problem, should enter "an
interstate agreement to provide uniformity in State Conservation
laws on certain major points, such as (1) unit operation, (2)
protection against waste consequent on overproduction, and (3)
conservation of gas energy, coupled with coordination between
the States of their conservation efforts under an arrangement
for liaison which will insure that curtailment in one State may
not be followed, as at present, by unproportional production for
another State." This is a highly suggestive proposal which it is
hoped will be acted upon for it holds out promise for the solution
of some difficult problems. The depression and confusion pre-
vailing in the coal industry, for example, might well be solved by
an interstate agreement similar to the one suggested.
However, whatever its advantages, the interstate agreement
is subject to very serious defects as an instrument of govern-
ment. In the first place, the method of the interstate compact
is -practically like the treaty process in international relations,
and like it, a slow and clumsy process, subject to all kinds of
hazards during the stages of negotiations and ratification. A
single state, with a relatively small population, may veto a
SOSee article by Frankfurter and Landis, "Compact Clause of the
Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments," in Yale Law Re-
view, XXXIV, 685 ff. Also Warren, The Supreme Court and Sovereign
States, 1924.
"New York T nmes, April 11, 1931.
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project of vital importance to another state or group of states.
Or if a single state may not always exercise an absolute veto, it
may greatly delay the execution of such projects. In the mean-
while, irreparable damage may have been done. We have two
very recent examples of the possibilities of obstruction which the
compact system affords single recalcitrant states. Arizona
held up the Boulder Dam project for several years through its
obstructionist tactics during the negotiation of the Colorado
River Compact and by its refusal to ratify that agreement. New
Jersey has played a similar role in the Tn-State Compact
between New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania for the diver-
sion of the water of the upper Delaware River water shed for the
use of New York City
And what is the remedy if one of the states fails to carry
out its part of the agreement? Would and could the Supreme
Court enforce an interstate compact 9 In 1915 Washington and
Oregon entered a compact for the protection of fish in the Colum-
bia River, but Washington has failed to carry it out, If the
compact is not self-executory, can the Supreme Court compel a
state legislature to pass the necessary legislation for its execu-
tion, or otherwise hold the state responsible?
In doubt, also, is the nature and extent of power which may
be conferred upon an adnunistrative body erected under an in-
terstate agreement. For example, in Cooley v Board of War-
dens of Phskadelph=12 the Supreme Court, in the interpretation
of the interstate commerce clause, laid down the doctrine that
whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or
admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, require
exclusive legislation by Congress. Could a regional body under
an interstate compact be given jurisdiction over regional inter-
state commerce? Could Congress thus divest itself of its power
over vast areas of interstate commerce? And what about the
limitations of the powers of the state in taxing interstate com-
merce ? All tins is still in doubt.
Another defect of the interstate agreement is that control
set up under it would not be subject to any single superior or
corrective body responsible to the people. Any faults the
administration may develop cannot be speedily corrected because
" 12 Howard 299, 13 L. Ed. 996.
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of the joint control. Moreover, many of the regional problems
require constant creative legislation, and cannot be regulated by
an administrative board. Furthermore, the compact method
would lead to many compacts, each compact confined to a specific
problem, and thus lead to a bewildering multiplicity of boards,
and a disintegrated interstate administrative system.
In spite of all its defects, it is desirable that the compact
method be fully exploited, in order that its potentialities may be
learned. If it fails, and all other existing constitutional methods
for developing regional government fail, we may find ourselves
at a crucial point in our constitutional history, caught between
the opposite evils of impotent, de-vitalized states and an over
burdened, bureaucratic, centralized national government. It
may well be that all the forces of reaction will line themselves
behind the mask of state rights, in order to evade all effective
regulation. The American people nght after a period of stag-
nation be led into a mood more acceptable to fundamental con-
stitutional revision, a revision in which the region would receive
recognition as a basic political unit.
